The story of the Liberian civil war appears to be very similar to that of many African countries - protracted, chaotic and violent. It was protracted because each time any attempt was made to resolve the crisis, warring factions in the conflict would make sure refusing to comply extended it. It was chaotic for the same reason; finally, it was violent given the death toll, and the extent of the killings each time ECOMOG clamped down hard on the warring factions.

Nevertheless, the role of ECOMOG in Liberia remains a moot point. This is because there has long been a perception in the West that Africa is a Dark Continent characterized by such violence and chaos that prospects of resolving its problems will not only remain constantly abortive, but will yield foregone conclusions that are effectively chronic failures. Therefore, any efforts for Africa to resolve its own problems may be unfairly judged as potential failures.

However, one useful way to best evaluate this outlook is through the Cold War period when, according to Stanley Meisler , "most people found Africa on their minds when the newly independent Congo erupted in 1960." The catalyst for this had come from the West African State of Ghana, when, in 1957, it made African headline news as the first (West) African country to declare independence from its European colonizer. Consequently, this sparked the decolonization process to such an extent that by the end of the seventies, most African countries had kicked out their colonialist predecessor.

Most importantly, however, for Africa was how the relatively young United Nations could now help it maintain the peace and stability it so needed. The date 1960 is actually important here, for it is from this point onwards that one sees the United Nations ready and willing to throw a lifeline to a potentially violent situation in Congo through the then secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold and his deployment of almost 20,000 troops under the auspices of the Security Council. It would be in this same year that the man who had been one of the co-architects of peacekeeping, along with former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson, would (unfortunately) meet his untimely death on his way to broker a fragile peace in the Congo. Despite his death, the spirit with which Hammarskjold worked towards peace has much lived on today in the form of peacekeeping.

In fact, peacekeeping is a very problematic reality these days, therefore, it is important to make the distinction between traditional inter-position of UN forces and peace enforcement. The latter has appeared to be consistently anathema to many of the peacekeeping operations that have been established since UNEF I was set up in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Today, peacekeeping operations around the world have been deemed by cynics as, at best, inefficient and, at worst, failures. This is not without reason, for implicit in peacekeeping is the idea that there is a peace to keep. However, UN peacekeeping operations have consistently demonstrated that they are powerless in the face of the people whom they seek to protect. Armed with only light weapons, and heavily predicating their raison d'être by a mandate.

Moreover, it begs the question of whether peace enforcement is not a better method in the long run. This is why, in my opinion, the case of Liberia is an interesting point of departure to assess this issue. In this paper, I hope to cover the background of the civil war that erupted in the West African State, and briefly describe the warring parties and factions in this conflict. I will eschew writing a direct history of the conflict since, in my opinion, it goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Most noteworthy, however, will be my attempt to demonstrate and offer an insight into how ECOWAS' force, ECOMOG, was able, despite its controversial nature, to bring the conflict in Liberia to some type of resolution through the unique and flexible way it shifted from peacekeeper to peace enforcer, as well as outline the various peace accords that brought closure to the conflict. Could it for all its flaws be a putative tool of conflict resolution in the West African region?

WHEN PEACEKEEPING TURNS TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT

They say nature abhors a vacuum. In some parts of Africa, military leaders have seemed all too ready to fill it with their cronies. And what better places to do so than in government. Liberia is a case in point. According to Barry Stein, author of "A Liberian War: A Modern Humanitarian Crisis (URL), "much of Liberia's turmoil can be traced back to the state's origins." . In 1822 a small group of emancipated slaves settled in what is now Monrovia. The movement was sponsored by the American Colonization Society and financed in part by the administration of President James Monroe - same president who declared the (in)famous Monroe Doctrine stating Latin America was the US's area of influence.

Stein goes on to argue that this idea of Monroe's was so as to enable freed slaves to settle in Africa (Stein); consequently, "the settlers also imposed forms of government similar to those of the US" . In 1847, they would break ties and proclaim Liberia an independent state". In fact, whereas all the other countries in the Western sub-region had been colonized by Europeans, Liberia stands as the exception. Consequently, it felt rebuffed when it asked the US for help and was duly snubbed upon; "there was an expectation that the US would intervene in what has often been described as its unofficial colony. But the US initially showed little concern for what it considered would be a brief disruption." (Online, Ero, Comfort. ECOWAS and the subregional Peacekeeping...) Ero maintains in her essay that the US "government stated that the resolution of this civil war is a Liberian responsibility of a solution to Liberia's current difficulties will be viable if it is worked (out) by Liberians themselves and has broad internal support" . Actually, the only response that came was "use of 200 US marines to rescue at least 300 US nationals on 5 August 1990 .

Small wonder, then that faced with the prospect of no US assistance in a colony that once belonged to them, the US would be promptly replaced by ECOWAS and its peacekeeping force, ECOMOG. However, this ultimately begs the question of why ECOWAS was actually embroiled in the conflict, and why it felt the need to resolve the Liberian conflict at all?

How and why ECOWAS?

Thanks to the Treaty of Lagos of 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) went into effect with 15 members; today it is 16 strong Its primary objective is to maintain peace by economic integration and is therefore, an unusual catalyst for peace. According to the article "West Africa Intervention Precedes Legitimacy" (Online), ECOWAS is "West Africa's most comprehensive sub-regional economic organisation, and one of the largest of its kind in the world."

According to the ECOWAS Treaty, its aim is "to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, the purpose, of which is to increase the standard of living of its people to enhance and maintain economic stability, to strengthen relations between its members and to contribute to progress and development on the African continent" (Art. 2) .

The Community aims to engender this ideal through the promotion of trade and liberalisation, "increased freedom of movement for its populations, transportation development and co-ordination, co-ordination of telecommunications, industrial and agricultural growth" .

With respect to the practice of diplomacy and security cooperation, the article argues that ECOWAS' involvement in the Liberian conflict has by no means elevated it to the "main African governmental actor involved {in peacekeeping} . It maintains that in fact, "regional diplomacy of a sort has been carried out by various African Heads of State, such as in the Senegalese-Mauritania conflict".

Nonetheless, in order to obtain a better understanding of how ECOWAS operated in the conflict, it is necessary to outline most of the major organs, which according to Klaas van Walraven (author of Containing Conflict...) were "relevant to the intervention in the Liberian Conflict" the so-called Authority with, in a subservient position, the Council of Ministers; the standing Mediation Committees, the organization's Executive Secretary; the military intervention force itself, ECOMOG...; the Special Emergency Fund, the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary of his supporting Staff, the so-called Committee of Five and the Monitoring Committee of Nine, and finally, the ECOWAS Observer Group for the Liberian Elections" . Although an extensive analysis of these organs are necessary to understand how ECOWAS managed the conflict, I will eschew a comprehensive description of them as it falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, it would be very difficult to understand how decisions were made without referring to the Authority.

According to Walraven, it is the "principal governing institution." and its sessions are held once a year, "with the presidency and venue rotating among the membership" . It is, in fact the legislative and supervisory organ of the Community, and consequently has the "general direction and control of the Community's executive functions and defines the norms and rules, which are binding for all other organs . In fact, Walraven goes as far as to categorically stating that with respect to the practice of intervention in Liberia, the Authority must be considered as the crucial ECOWAS institution" .

As for the Council of Ministers, it convenes at least twice a year and has the power to recommend to the Authority and may dictate to subordinate organs of ECOWAS . Although the Councils is comprised mostly of Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs, "it may also serve as the cadre for meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and those of Defence."

Perhaps, the most instrumental in the context of the intervention in Liberia was the office of Executive Secretary. In a way, this post is much like the UN's Secretary General in the way its role is chiefly administrative, "while Article 8 provides for a policy-making role" .

In April 1990, the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was established on a 'de facto basis, upon the initiative of Nigeria . The Committee, established by four ECOWAS Member States designated by the Authority, was explicitly intended as a permanent organ. The composition of the committee was to be revised every three years. In 1990, the SMC was thus made up of Nigerian, Ghana, Gambia, Togo and Mali , Walraven maintains that it was "in this organ that the decision was taken to establish ECOMOG, a plan that was prepared by a sub-committee on Defence Matters inside the SMC."

Finally, the two institutions established "on an ad hoc basis that were relevant to the intervention in Liberia were the so-called "Committee of Five and the Monitoring Committee of Nine." The former was formed "at the conclusion of a meeting in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, in June 1991 between the Heads of State of Nigeria, Gambia, Togo, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, as well as Charles Taylor, "the principal warlord, and Amos Sawyer, the President of the 'Interim Government'".

As for the latter, it was "originated through a decision of a joint meeting of the Committee of Five and the Standing Mediation Committee, organized in Cotonou, Benin, in October 1992". It was decided here that both committees would work together towards implementation of the ECOWAS Peace Plan, this particular peace plan, was a decision made by the SMC to establish ECOMOG. It is involved according to Walraven "an appeal of the committee to the belligerent parties to observe an immediate cease-fire in order to work towards the restoration and maintenance of peace and security throughout Liberia" . In the SMC's final communiqué, this mandate was formulated more succinctly as 'keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease-fire {would be} respected.

As for the latter, it was "originated through a decision of a joint meeting of the 'Committee of Five and the Standing Mediation Committee, organized in Cotonou, Benin, in October 1992." It was decided here that both committees would work together towards the implementation of the ECOWAS Peace Plan. This particular peace plan was a decision by the SMC to establish ECOMOG. It involved, according to Walraven, "an appeal of the committee to the belligerent parties to observe an immediate cease-fire in order to work towards the restoration and maintenance of peace and security throughout Liberia." In the SMC's final communiqué, this mandate was formulated more succinctly as 'keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease-fire {would be} respected. It was also decided that the Committee would work more particularly towards the execution of the accords of Yamoussoukro. The rationale for these committees became clearer once ECOWAS became actively involved in the conflict, which broke out in1989.

Genesis of Conflict

On Christmas Eve 1989, "a full scale guerrilla war erupted as rebels known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, a former minister in the administration of President Samuel Doe, invaded Liberia from its border with Ivory Coast. . According to Comfort Ero "it degenerated into ethnic carnage that threatened to engulf the whole country." Taylor went on to terrorize the country with his campaign in Nimba county, home of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, which greatly suffered under Doe" . Allegations of genocide soon followed as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) slaughtered those tribes; consequently, reprisals by the NPFL brought even greater suffering . The situation deteriorated to such an extent that even foreign nationals were taken hostage and UN sites as well as foreign embassies came under attack.

Soon after, the NPFL controlled the majority of Liberian territory and by May 1990, President Doe, in what looked like a sinister presage to the genocide in Rwanda, "was constrained to call upon 'all patriotic citizens' to join forces with the government and fight the rebels with 'cutlasses and single-barrelled guns.'"

As the conflict became more protracted, "over half the country's population of 2.6 million was displaced internally and externally, as, for example, the Liberians who took refuge in neighbouring countries rose exponentially to 700,000." At this point, this prompts one to question why the so-called international community was demonstrating no desire to involve itself in stemming the conflict.

For example, neither UN Member States nor the OAU took any collective action. According to Comfort Ero, "international concerns were The Gulf and later conflicts in the former Yugoslavia." Apparently, the OAU, which would have been in the better position to actively participate in the containment of the conflict, was constrained by "a lack of resources and political will reinforced by vivid memories of its perceived failure in Chad in 1981." In short, it remained yet again, toothless: "it only went as far as hailing" the laudable efforts deployed by ECOWAS and expressed its total support for its initiatives." This naturally was not a sufficient panacea for containing the conflict.

Faced with this diplomatic inertia, many of the West African countries believed - for better or for worse - that they had no choice but to attempt to resolve the crisis by themselves. The crisis was "thus officially addressed by ECOWAS in May 1990, with the establishment of the SMC . At the urging of President Babangida of Nigeria, an emergency meeting of Foreign Ministers of members of the SMC was held on July 5 1990, to work out modalities of a cease-fire and a peace plan, after which a decision was made to deploy a peacekeeping force to Liberia" . Subsequent to these decisions was ECOWAS' decision to deploy ECOMOG, deployed to Monrovia in late August 1990. It consisted of 4,000 troops from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra-Leone and Nigeria, which contributed about 70% of the force. Although the first ECOMOG force commander was a Ghanaian, as Solinas and Lund concede, "Nigerian dominance was obvious from the outset" . Nonetheless, on 25 August 1990, 3000 troops from ECOMOG landed in Monrovia in what was to become a protracted conflict involving many warring factions.

ECOMOG's role in Liberia

ECOMOG's role in the crisis is open to interpretation. There are those, on the one hand, who argue, such as Walraven, that it was flawed and perhaps wrong; then there are those who believe its role was unprecedented and praiseworthy. Throughout my research, it appears Walraven is the most critical, though admittedly, he is also the most comprehensive in his analysis of ECOMOG's role.

With respect to the proponents, however, according to a former Field Commander of ECOMOG, Brigadier-General Adetunyi Idowu Olurin (rtd.) for example, "the Liberian situation and ECOMOG deployment was a test case in regional peacekeeping effort {in that} it proved that nations within a region are often familiar with the political situation of the neighbouring states and when conflict ensues, ...know key personalities involved." He goes on to argue that it "proved successful lending credence to the statement that the regional peacekeeping process can be effective and can be replicated in any other region." Also, Lund and Solinas argue that at the regional level, "ECOWAS in particular, holds promising approaches to West Africa's immediate and potential conflicts {to such an extent that} in 1995, one analyst was led to compare West Africa with other regions such as South America, in order to consider whether this region could be regarded as an emergency 'security community' and 'zone of peace'" .

Comfort Ero, conversely, does not advance a similar argument, preferring to remain neutral when she writes that "the decision taken by ECOWAS to intervene can be seen as a novel move." . She then goes on to ask "why then should a multilateral organisation established for economic integration assume the responsibility and the management of conflicts in the sub-region."

In my opinion, detractors would primarily argue that in the organisation, at least one member, most probably possessed an agenda, which it could only effectively execute through this intervention. In fact this is what throughout the conflict, Nigeria appeared to be doing especially since 70 % of the ECOMOG force was Nigerian-led.

Conversely, proponents would defend the functionalist view that such regional organisations are equally instrumental in the maintenance of peace, and that ECOWAS merely wanted closure to a potentially problematic conflict. In fact, Comfort Ero proposes three principal reasons why ECOWAS went into conflict.

First of all, ECOWAS believed that "regional instability was inevitable due to the overflow and displacement of refugees in neighbouring countries." Consequently, there was a fear that the conflict would trigger lateral pressure to such an extent that refugees would feel compelled to spillover into neighbouring countries, such as Sierra-Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast.

Secondly, ECOWAS went in purely for humanitarian reasons. According to Ero, "in its Final Communiqué, the Standing Committee gave a strongly humanitarian rationale for its decisions, {to that effect} adding that presently, there is a government in Liberia which cannot govern contending factions which are holding the entire population as hostages depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life." Moreover, an ECOWAS statement in August 1990 was more "explicit in emphasizing a humanitarian objective.". In it, it stated that there needed to be a "stopping {of} the senseless killing of innocent civilians, nationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions."

Finally, justification for intervention was predicated on the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence . According to Article 16 of the Protocol, "the Head of State of a member country under attack may request action or assistance from the community."

Nevertheless, it is not hard to see why the detractors of ECOMOG have a case, which Comfort Ero further outlines. The most prominent is the idea that two individual Member States -- Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire -- had their own reasons for wanting to intervene. Apparently, at the beginning of the conflict, supporters of Doe claimed that Taylor forces had been trained in Burkina (and Libya) and had entered the country from Côte d'Ivoire -- a claim which was denied by the States concerned."

Furthermore, there may have been a personal reason, which directs our attention to the "Burkinabe leader and President Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire." Apparently, Doe had killed President Tolbert and arrested his eldest son, Adolphus Tolbert, the son-in-law of Houphouet-Boigny, who was subsequently killed in jail. . Ero maintains that it is against this background that the Ivorian leader was believed to have encouraged another of his sons-in-law, Blaise Compaore to support the rebel cause. . It is believed Compaore, in turn, introduced Taylor to the Libyan leader Colonel Ghadaffi, whose involvement in the conflict, despite falling beyond the scope of this paper, in my opinion, remains apocryphal.

Whatever the case may be, it is hard to deny that there was serious political will on the ECOWAS Member States, and this is exemplified by ECOMOG's controversial role as peacekeeper. It is controversial because, many believe, as N.D. White , that ECOMOG "attempted to tread the neutral tightrope of a true peacekeeping force" , but found itself "embroiled in the civil war, particularly after the death of President Doe in September 1990." He goes on to argue that ECOMOG "...overstepped the boundary between consensual and neutral peacekeeping and military enforcement action."

This actually begs the question of what enforcement action is, and to obtain an insight into this, we turn to Adam Roberts who proposes four dilemmas inherent in peacekeeping with force.

The first is based on the idea that using force increases the "risks to lightly armed peacekeepers in vulnerable positions" as exemplified by the case of Somalia. The second is predicated on the idea that the use of force" in complex civil wars frequently involves killing and injuring civilians as well as armed adversaries." Roberts maintains the third dilemma - perhaps most important in the Liberian context -- that most uses of force "risk undermining perceptions of the impartiality of the peacekeeping force" . The final dilemma is that "there must be a reluctance to leave the decision to others when the lives of peacekeepers and the reputation of the {organization} is at stake."

With respect to Liberia, Ero argues that ECOMOG's deployment has raised significant questions about its legitimacy, neutrality and effectiveness. ECOMOG was faced with Robert's third dilemma in that "the consistent denial by NPFL of ECOMOG's compromised neutrality undermined its authority in Liberia." In fact, as early as October 1990, "the neutrality and peacekeeping nature of ECOMOG was in question especially when it was seen as assuming a combative role in alliance with the INPFL and ADFL." This was because after the ECOMOG force landed on August 27 1990, Charles Taylor promised to intensify his attack in order to undermine their advancement. What he did not know was that within a month of landing ECOMOG's strategy would transform into a conventional offensive with the aim of driving Taylor's troops out of Monrovia. Although ECOMOG had controlled Monrovia by November 1990, Comfort Ero maintains that its actual mission "bordered on peace-making and peace enforcement, which was a major departure from its original mandate." Meanwhile ECOWAS had begun "a long slow search for the elusive formula that would unify the country under free and fair elections."

The first came in the form of peace talks in Bamako, Mali on 27 November 1990 which was also the same time when the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) under Amos Sawyer was sworn in. Two other peace talks took place at Lome, Togo in February 1991 and Monrovia, Liberia in March 1991. These later remained abortive on account of Taylor's refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the interim government.

Most significant, however, in bringing closer attention to resolving the crisis were the meetings in the Ivorian city of Yamoussoukro. There, "the meeting attempted to reconcile Taylor and Sawyer who, indeed, 'pledged their reconciliation... by a long and warm embrace." Although it would take three prior meetings for some progress to be made, it can be argued that Yamoussoukro IV Accord was agreed by warring factions as a step taken together "to constitute a framework for the settlement of the crisis."

Equally significant was the Cotonou Agreement of July 1993. It was here that for the first time since the conflict, both the OAU and UN acknowledged efforts made by ECOWAS: "the signing of the Cotonou Agreement marked a new phase for ECOWAS as it embarked on peacemaking mission in cooperation with the UN (and also the OAU). According to Ero, what was different about the Cotonou Agreement in view of the past agreements was that ECOMOG was to be expanded to include two contingents from outside the West African sub-region - Tanzania and Uganda and a UN observer mission.

Walraven lends credence to this idea too when he writes how the Cotonou accord "was the most comprehensive agreement so far and all later accords would merely supplement this key agreement." In fact, the accord stipulated in great detail how Liberia should walk out of the quandary . He maintains that "the belligerents would observe a new cease-fire to be monitored by ECOMOG and the UNOMIL" .

The parties agreed to slowly disarm. Specifically, they came to an agreement not to "import weapons and war-like material, use the cease-fire for a military build-up or engage in other activities that would violate the cease-fire. They also recognized that the ECOWAS-UN arms embargo would stay in place."

The accords stipulated some political arrangements, of which the most important was the Interim Government of National Unity being replaced by the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG). The accords' final provision concerned "a general amnesty to be given for any acts committed by the parties or their forces while in actual combat." Unfortunately, the Cotonou Agreement was also undermined by the snail-like pace in establishing the LNTG. After some pussy-footing over its precise composition, it was finally formed on 7 March 1994, under a five-person Council of State. Free and faie elections were equally proposed to be held in September 1994.

As a number of obstacles continued to hamper the implementation of the Cotonoi Agreement, several meetings were convened leading to the signing of two agreements. These were the Akosombo Agreement (September 1994), which was supplementary to the Cotonou Accord, as well as the Agreement on what was to become the Accra Agreement, signed in the Ghanaian capital, in December 1994.

According to Walraven, "Ghana worked on the premise that a solution tothe Liberian crisis had to come from the warring factions themselves, especially, Taylor's NPFL." In hindsight, this increasingly also appears to be the case, since efforts to resolve the crisis, were consistently being stymied by these factions. He continues that the "Ghanaians argued that the factions had not disarmed as this had not been in their interest and that therefore had to be lured with a political prize to give up their guns." Although this prize was to be remain elusive, what the Accra agreements, flawed as it may have been, showed was that "existing factions would be taken into account when deciding" on important issues with respect to settlement of civilain life, such as public agencies, corporations, agencies, etc.

One of the Agreements' downside was that "Liberian citizens were outraged and generally interpreted Akosombo as an attempt to install a military 'junta'." These were not the only unsatisfied -- the factions were also. Apparently, some had been left outside Akosombo and were therefore opposed to it. Nonetheless, the agreement attempted to "install a new ceasefire and introduce several safe havens and buffer zones in accordance with the Cotonou and Akosombo accords."

Conclusion: Aspirants of Regional Peace?

For ECOWAS, Liberia will probably remain not only a milestone in their quest for peace in Africa, but as a symbolic indication that Africans can resolve their problems without Western assistance. For the international community, it will probably be seen a little less optimistically -- and understandably so. If one were to go by White's argument on how ECOMOG was trying to tread the tightrope of peacekeeping but found itself embroiled in the conflict, and consequently, maintaining what little peace there was by force, then, perhaps, the detractors have a point.

Furthermore, some will argue that peacekeeping means just that -- keeping the peace that is hoped to be built. Once force comes into the picture, then it hardly qualifies as peaceful. I have no doubts that there will be some who strongly adhere to the neutral, yet toothless, peacekeepers that we are used to.

Nonetheless, how far must we go before we realize that this needs a change? Peacekeeping is problematic enough for it to continue remaining toothless. ECOMOG was admittedly flawed, but it worked. This does not mean to say that it can always work the way it did in Liberia, but perhaps, there are lessons that other regional organizations, working under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can adopt, and henceforth contribute in distributing the labour of the herculean task which peacekeeping is for the UN.

Of these lessons, the most important, in my opinion, would have to be that a relatively balanced rapid intervention force would have to be just that -- balanced, not 70% led by one nation, as Nigeria clearly was. Three authors lend credence to this. The first are Solinas and Lund, when they write: "Nigeria wished to assume a leadership role in the region and to check possible Libyan designs in the area." Comfort Ero also lends credence to this idea: "Beyond the concerns for its nationals, the Liberian conflict has provided Nigeria with the opportunity to establish itself as the most influential mediator in the sub-region." Perhaps the most trenchant arguments, finally, come from Walraven. He argues that "Nigeria's influence over ECOMOG goes some way to explain the latter's lack of neutrality and the counter-productive effect of its intervention." He argues that "politically and institutionally, it was clear that Nigeria was in command of the intervention force." Apparently, so involved was Nigeria in the conflict that it went to the extent of replacing a Ghanaian commander with a Nigerian one once Samuel Doe was murdered on the way to ECOMOG headquarters.

The final lesson is that there should be unity. ECOWAS almost ran the risk of appearing to pay lip-service to peace when results consistently remained elusive. Funnily enough, it was the francophone countries which took the initiative of the Yamoussokro Accords in Ivory Coast, which eventually created an atmosphere conducive to collaboration. This had been the result of a latent friction felt by the francophone countries that the anglophones were leading the way too much for a small organization like ECOWAS'. Their initiative proved praiseworthy -- as did ECOMOG's role to an extent. If ECOWAS is to become the putative tool of conflict resolution in West Africa, and perhaps one that can be emulated in the rest of Africa, it must be willing to subordinate political and personal interests to that of peace.